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The current age is characterised by an unprecedented integration of legal systems, 
economies and cultural exchange across the global community.  The drive to 
understand ourselves in light of on-going developments in knowledge and re-cast 
divisions that fragment the world population is gaining momentum.  One meme that 
has sought to assist this process through the promotion of peace, order and good 
government is the culture of human rights. 
 
However, several problems have emerged with the traditional formulation of human 
rights.  They assail the acceptance of a human rights culture as the hegemonic norm 
in public law across all jurisdictions; some ‘Eastern’ jurisdictions assert that human 
rights are a ‘Western’ construct and use this argument to reject the notion of human 
rights as a form of cultural imperialism.  Furthermore, the practical application of 
human rights principles when subordinated to the operation of international law 
conventions permits practices that are against the fundamental nature of those 
principles: the practice of extraordinary rendition; and those seeking asylum often 
face poor treatment in foreign jurisdictions to name two. 
 
Preliminary Observations 
 
Dhall (2009: in print) posited a new ontological foundation for human rights that 
draws from a culture of science in general and quantum mechanical unified field 
theories in particular.  This paper discusses how a justification for human rights on 
this basis may advance the dialogue and the development of human rights.  However, 
two important preliminary points need to be raised:   
 
First that the process for the systematic and sustainable integration of new knowledge 
into an existing system is in three distinct steps; to define a new concept (or re-define 
an existing one); to assess implications of the defined concept in light of the 
functional environment pertaining to that concept; and finally to articulate the 
necessary reforms and provide avenues for that integration to occur.  Accordingly this 
paper acknowledges that the functional reality of the environment in which nation-
states apply human rights is subject to swathe of additional influences; political 
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expediency of rule; the operation of internal law, manifesting legitimate expressions 
of cultural relativism and economic rationalism.  
 
The second point relates to careful scrutiny that is required of the relationship 
between the law and the specific aspects of science used to develop the proposed 
ontological basis of human rights.  The complexity of the relationship between law 
and science is not too dissimilar to that between law and medicine captured in the 
elegant expression in which Windyer J observed that law is 'marching with medicine 
but in the rear and limping a little' (Mount Isa Mines Ltd v. Puseyii).  This situation, 
whilst frustrating to those on the edge of research seeking guidance from the law in 
its various forms, ensures that premature regulation avoids errors of fact.  The 
consequences for prematurely integrating new developments into law may be dire.  
This manifest in legal scholarship as an epistemological problem, that of determining 
when knowledge is legitimate and when it is systemically desirable that it influences 
the fabric of the law.   
 
However, since knowledge follows an iterative path there is some pressure for steady 
reform, as there is a logical need to incorporate a systemic mechanism by which 
paradigm-altering information may be integrated, normative values and institutional 
constructs revised to maintain the currency of social institutions.  This becomes 
particularly necessary if erroneous information is given a place within the body of 
understanding both individually and across our whole society.    
 
Dhall (2009, in print) showed that the ideological foundation for human rights 
doctrines in the western world can be traced to Natural Law, which itself can be 
bifurcated into Ecclesiastical and Stoic streams.  The Natural Law foundation is 
partially responsible for allegations that human rights are a ‘Western’ construct.  He 
provided an alternative basis for human rights by evolving an ontological construct of 
holism that increasingly moved from a predominantly internal epistemology with a 
strong ethno-cultural or religious focus toward an external epistemology that relies 
upon the culture of science. This foundation of holism is corroborated by various 
disciplines within the empiricist community; quantum mechanical field theories and 
transpersonal psychology (Grof, 2000; Laszlo, 2003; 2007).  It is of interest that 
many mystical traditions and analytic philosophy corroborate such a structure (Esfeld, 
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2001; Harner, 1980; Khan, 1990; Zimmer 1951).  Furthermore, he adduced a body of 
new knowledge justifying the existence of human rights as a foundation for public 
law.  The term ‘Neo-Naturalism’ is proposed to distinguish this particular ideological 
substratum for human rights from the long-established justifications that rest upon 
traditional Natural law foundations.  Whilst the ontological construct and 
epistemology of this paradigm was explored more fully by Dhall, his main argument 
is as follows: 
 
Neo-Naturalism is a discrete paradigm of analysis emerging in the several sciences 
such as unified field theories in quantum mechanics and transpersonal psychology 
(Grof, 2000); looking at quanta in an entangled state or in superposition, and from 
remarkable evidence of observations of coherence in the fields of cellar biology, 
cosmology and consciousness research (Laszlo, 2003; 2007).  These findings assert 
that physical reality is fully described by a duality comprising classical physical 
reality and a supervening singular state.   
 
Whilst this raises many issues, two are of particular significance.  The first is that 
Cartesian duality describes only a part of reality, the penultimate, rather than ultimate 
structure of reality.  The second is that Neo-Naturalists rely upon an epistemological 
process that tends toward empiricism.  In legal theoretical discourse, empiricism as 
method for establishing the legal scope for an individual’s right is considered as lying 
within the tradition of legal positivism.  Thus, Neo-Naturalists embrace the mode of 
inquiry employed by Positivists, yet espouse a structure of reality more consistent 
with Natural law.  It is in this point of distinction from the existing paradigms of 
jurisprudence, inter alia, that Neo-Naturalism may legitimately be catagorised as a 
separate paradigm for describing the existential nature of reality. 
 
As noted, several problems assail human rights in practice; some of these problems 
can be attributed to both the current formulation of human rights and also to the 
environment in which human rights operate.  The current paradigm in international 
law rests upon the tradition of positivism and as such, employs utilitarian empiricism 
as the method by which the scope of protection afforded by any freedom or restraint 
is assessed.  This is in contradistinction to human rights doctrines, the central tenants 
of which can be stated as universal and inalienable rights predicated upon equality.  
5 
 
Utilitarian empiricism as a basis for moral theory has allowed legal pragmatists to 
subordinate human rights to a state-centric paradigm in international law.  This is one 
contentious aspect of the human rights debate that will be influenced by a Neo-
Naturalist foundation for Human Rights doctrines. 
 
A final concern is the aspect of international law that allows countries that have 
ratified treaties to enact only those articles that ‘suit’ them. This effectively gives 
states the power to control both the practice of human rights law and the theory, since 
they can exercise discretion in domestic enactment.  This paper is an exploration of 
how the human rights construct grounded on quantum holism proposed by Dhall 
(2009: in print) can, inter alia, advance the development of a universally acceptable 
model of human rights. 
 
I. International Lawiii 
 
A.  Challenging the State-Centric Focus of International Law 
 
Bodis in Six Livres de la Republique of 1576 laid the foundations of modern 
international law (Beaulac, 2003). However, Grotius is regarded as the ‘father’ of 
international law and is widely believed to have championed the secularisation of 
natural law in the modern age via his assertion that it would subsist even if God did 
not exist, ‘etiamsi daremus non esse Deum’.   The thrust of early jurisprudence in 
international law centered on protecting the sovereignty of nations, not protecting the 
rights of individuals.  This concept is apparent in the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648. 
This treaty ended the thirty-year war by placing the states of Western Europe on an 
equal footing and affirming their mutual autonomy.  The initial state-centric direction 
of international law has evolved into the doctrine of sovereignty, which is at the base 
of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of nation-states.  This is regarded as 
providing a rampart against the international protection of both human rights and the 
environment (Triggs, 2006). 
 
However, the preeminent respect for sovereignty is a double-edged sword in respect 
of the practical application of human rights.  Whilst it has been noted that human 
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rights are subordinate to the competing rights and values of sovereignty, Chinese 
officials and scholars believe that ‘sovereignty is the foundation and basic guarantee 
of human rights’ (Xie and Nui, 1994 extracted Donnelly).  Further, the Beijing 
Information Office of the State Council claims that ‘[t]he rights of each country to 
formulate its own policies on human rights protection in light of its own conditions 
should…be respected and guaranteed’ (Chinese Government,1993 extracted from 
Donnelly).  The Chinese position reflects the notions of social-contractarians such as 
Locke, Kant, Paine and Hobbes in that the state is essential to ensure the availability 
of human rights since they are not be available to humans in nature (Freeman, 2001).  
This notion is impossible to assess definitively as the concept of humans in nature is a 
hypothetical.  
 
Several problems arise from the practical application of human rights within a state-
centric paradigm.  Firstly, the conventions of international law in its current form do 
not stipulate that ratifying a treaty equates to creating an automatic adoption into 
domestic law.  Whilst some jurisdictions adopt this practice, a nation-state need not 
enact all aspects of ratified treaties, and the articles not entrenched in domestic 
legislation offer a dubious level of protection, if any.  This is apparent in Australia,iv 
where ambiguous common law protection is available in the form of ‘legitimate 
expectation’. 
 
 The Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teohv held that there is a 
‘legitimate expectation’ that administrative officials will inform themselves about 
treaty obligations accepted by Australia.  Mason CJ and Deane J stated: 
 
The provisions of an international convention to which Australia is a party, 
especially one which declares universal fundamental rights, may be used by the 
courts as a legitimate guide in developing the common law…[R]atification of a 
convention is a positive statement by the executive government of this country 
to the world and to the Australian people that the executive government will act 
in accordance with the Convention.  That positive statement is an adequate 
foundation for legitimate expectation…that administrative decision makers will 
act in conformity with the Convention.  
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Whilst the High Court has affirmed the notion of ‘legitimate expectation’, Minister 
for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs Ex parte Lamvi showed the court itself will 
restrict the application of the rule in Teoh.  Prominent jurists from around the world 
have framed the relationship between ratified treaties and domestic law in terms that 
indicate a ratified treaty is a guideline to assist the interpretation of any given law in 
the absence of the relevant government having an express policy (Kirby, 1999).  
Whilst this articulates a use for ratified treaties in domestic matters, it does not alter 
the essentially dualist approach to international and domestic jurisdictions.  The 
relationship between ratified treaties, articles not domestically enacted and the scope 
and nature of rights available to the citizen is ultimately unclear to citizens of many 
nations, including Australia (Griffith and Evans, 2001).  Uncertainty in the law is 
undesirable as it subverts Rule of Law; ergo, resolving the discord would be 
systemically desirable, as it would affirm the Rule of Law in the relevant 
jurisdictions. 
 
A second problem that arises from state-centric sovereignty is that whilst human 
rights are owed only to citizens of a nation-state (and foreign nationals in their 
territory or otherwise subject to their jurisdiction or control) there are notable 
exceptions.  The concept of nation-states acting in the ‘national interest’ is one such 
example in which human rights are given a ‘back seat’ as illustrated by the following 
two case studies of mandatorily detaining asylum seekers in Australia and the practice 
of extraordinary rendition. 
 
B. Case Study 1: Mandatory Detention of Asylum Seekers in Australia 
 
Whilst the Australian government dispensed with the policy of mandatory detention 
of asylum seekers in July 2008, this issue is an example of human rights being 
subordinated to political considerations.  The change in policy was the result of a 
change in government at a national election.  The direction of policy reform is toward 
an increasingly liberal adoption of human rights, however, the legal mechanisms in 
place allow for a reversion of policy if it is deemed politically expedient.  As such, 
this issue can be used to demonstrate how easily a policy of mandatory detention can 
be reinstated.  The relevant legislation is Section 176 of the Australian Migration Act 
1958 (Cth): 
8 
 
This Division is enacted because the Parliament considers that it is in the 
national interest that each non-citizen who is a designated person should be kept 
in immigration detention until he or she:  
                     (a)  leaves Australia; or  
                     (b)  is given a visa. 
The question of establishing who is caught by this provision boils down to the 
interpretation of two key phrases, ‘national interest’ and ‘designated person’.  The 
broad definition attached to ‘designated person’ during the policy of mandatory 
detention for asylum seekers could not be challenged by the ambit of judicial 
discretion afforded under the concept of ‘legitimate expectation’ as the policy itself 
was expressly articulated.  This policy of mandatory detention prompted three UN 
treaty bodies to publish observations on Australia's obligations towards asylum-
seekers. All three noted incongruity between ratified obligations and domestic 
legislation.  The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) 
recommended the ‘faithful’ implementation of international refugee law. The Human 
Rights Commission (HRC) recommended policy changes on mandatory detention 
under the Migration Act. The Committee against Torture found ‘an apparent lack of 
appropriate review mechanisms for ministerial decisions’ on people who may face 
torture if deported (Amnesty International, 2001).  The findings of those bodies did 
not change the government’s policy orientation.  The latitude afforded when acting in 
the ‘national interest’ does not preclude any future express change in policy regarding 
the definition of ‘designated person’ having an even wider scope than during the 
policy of detaining asylum seekers.   Indeed, legislation in Australia currently under 
review but still in force, allows those detained to be invoiced for their detention 
(Mottram, 2009).   
C. Case Study 2: Extraordinary Rendition 
Acting in the ‘national interest’ is also at the root of the practice of extraordinary 
rendition, specifically in relation to the United Stated led ‘War on Terror’.  
Extraordinary rendition is a hybrid human rights violation, combining elements of 
arbitrary arrest, enforced disappearance, forcible transfer, torture, denial of access to 
consular officials, and denial of impartial tribunals (Weissbrodt and Bergquist, 2006).  
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It involves the state-sponsored abduction of a person in one country, with or without 
the cooperation of the government of that country, and the subsequent transfer of that 
person to another country for detention and interrogation.  Weissbrodt and Bergquist 
have tested the practice of extraordinary rendition against international human rights 
instruments and has found that the practice breaches numerous conventions in the 
UDHR, ICCPR, ICESCR, both the Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, the Convention Against Torture, the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations and the Geneva Conventions.   
The practice of extraordinary rendition is predicated on the discretion afforded to 
nation-states under a state-centric paradigm in international law, notwithstanding that 
the United States is a jurisdiction in which ratified treaties are self-executing.  This 
means that the practice of extraordinary rendition was able to be put into operation 
even though the human rights treaties ratified by the United States created rights and 
liabilities without the need for further action by Congress.   
 
D. Commentary on the Case Studies 
 
The fact such practices are permissible undermines the Rule of Law in a manner 
analogous to jurisdictions that adopt a formal dualist approach.  In such cases, the 
rights contained in the ratified treaty are not assimilated into the domestic jurisdiction 
with absolute clarity.  Tempering the perception of absolute discretion residing with 
nation-states which may inflict fundamental and gross human rights violations, the 
doctrine of jus cogens provides a degree of comfort in the forum of international law.  
Jus cogens is defined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 as a 
‘norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character’.  However 
only certain rights are classified as non-derogable and the doctrine of non-intervention 
in state affairs must be balanced.vii   Thus, intervention by the international 
community is only possible in the direst of circumstances and any discussions 
centered on triggering active intervention will be subject to a swathe of additional 
influences, such as economics and political expediency.   This shows that the 
protection offered by conventions such as the UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR falls well 
short of being ‘inalienable’, notwithstanding ratification by member states; this 
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highlights the tension between state-centric and human-centric concerns in human 
rights enforcement. 
 
The global historical record of accomplishment for implementing human rights shows 
a fitful application.  Notwithstanding the articulation of both Natural law and human 
rights principles, numerous atrocities have been committed in the evolution of human 
societies.  These have included abundant instances of genocide, the practice of 
slavery, the torture of prisoners, the imprisonment of political dissidents and the 
observation of abject poverty with cold detachment.  It is apparent that some of the 
most significant areas of concern in the implementation of human rights are 
attributable to preeminence of state-centric sovereignty in international law.  This 
position is increasingly difficult to sustain in a rapidly globalising world, as the 
concept is emerging that nations conduct themselves as good ‘global citizens’.  
Furthermore, a strict demarcation along geo-political boundaries of responsibility for 
protecting human rights further fragments our world view and thus weakens the 
‘universal’ aspect of human rights in practice. 
 
One avenue of challenging the current legal status-quo may emerge from developing a 
Neo-Naturalist basis to human rights grounded in an acknowledgement that every 
person in the world is subject to supervening holism.   In developing a human rights 
regime derived from holism, an appeal is made to legal pragmatists that seek ‘the 
liberation of thinking about law from superstition and dogma so that laws [can] be 
based on objective, ascertainable, scientific facts’ (Triggs, 2006).  As stated prior, 
holism is an epistemologically justifiable ontological construct that legitimises 
recognition of human rights, and further creates an imperative for their recognition. 
 
The ontology of quantum holism employed in Dhall (2009: in print) is distinguishable 
from the claims of weak epistemology assailing the foundational claims currently 
employed to substantiate human rights doctrines because it is the product of diligent 
scientific research.  This is arguably the most significant aspect of research into 
theories of holism employing structural realism.  Recognising holism as 
epistemologically valid mandates a paradigm shift in international law.  There is no 
doubt that evolution will be needed at the institutional level, as the operational 
construct of international law is inadequate to incorporate such a change.  Whilst the 
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process of reform is complex and time consuming, it is the nature of the law that its 
content and institutions are imbued with sufficient flexibility to adapt to change. 
 
II. Exploring Cultural Relativity and Challenging 
Conceptions of Human Rights as Imperialism 
 
One further aspect of the human rights dialogue that will be assisted by the emergence 
of a strong basis is a challenge to the allegation that human rights are a Western 
imperialistic construct.  Historically, some Eastern countries claim that human rights 
derive from ‘Western’ values as opposed to Eastern values.viii  Recently, Singaporean 
government official, Kausikan (1993) posits the ‘myth of the universality’ and 
provides a concise exposition on the substance of the debate: 
 
The diversity of cultural traditions, political structures, and levels of 
development will make it difficult, if not impossible, to define a single 
distinctive and coherent human rights regime that can encompass the vast region 
from Japan to Burma, with its Confucianist, Buddhist, Islamic and Hindu 
traditions.  Nonetheless, the movement toward such a goal is likely to continue.  
What is clear is that there is a general discontent with the purely Western 
interpretation on human rights. 
 
Kausikan states that in a culturally diverse planet the tension between traditional value 
systems and human rights doctrines is irreconcilable.  Donnelly (2003) notes that 
cultural relativism is an ‘undeniable fact; moral rules and social institutions evidence 
astonishing cultural and historical variability’.  Consequently some jurisdictions are 
able to reject human rights doctrines outright, such as Indonesia, Singapore and some 
nation-states in the Middle East.  Further, there is perceived hypocrisy by the 
‘champions’ of human rights as the chasm between the protection afforded by 
theoretical and practical human rights regimes discourages some nation-states from 
ratifying human rights conventions.  Feldman (2005) states ‘…if the United States 
aimed to demand accountability with international norms, it had better begin by 
actively and visibly upholding those norms itself’. 
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However, consensus on a large scale is apparent, as evidenced by ratification of 
ICCPR and ICESCR by 152 and 149 countries respectively.  Moreover, a degree of 
conceptual agreement between East and West is evident in upholding human rights 
insofar as the Bangkok Declaration of March 1993 is congruous with the Vienna 
Declaration and Program of Action on Human Rights 1993 in noting that human 
rights are ‘universal, indivisible and interdependent’.ix  In spite of this, one significant 
point of distinction between the two Declarations is a caveat written into the Bangkok 
Declaration which stresses that human rights should be considered with reference to 
the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of the state.  
Ghai (1994) cautions that the arguments posited must be absorbed with 
circumspection as: 
 
Perceptions of human rights are reflective of social and class positions in 
society.  What conveys as a picture of a uniform Asian perspective on human 
rights is the perspective of a particular group, that of the ruling elites, which gets 
international attention. What unites these elites is their notion of governance and 
the expediency of their rule.  For the most part the political systems they 
represent are not open or democratic, and their publicly expressed views on 
human rights are an emanation of these systems, of the need to justify 
authoritarianism and occasional repression.  
 
It is clear that notwithstanding many manifestations of consensus among the 
international community, much needs to be resolved in the drive for a universally 
accepted model of human rights.  
 
A. Comments on Cultural Relativism in Light of Neo-Naturalism 
 
The basis of human rights posited by Dhall (2009: in print) is relevant to the current 
debate on Human Rights as universally normative notwithstanding legitimate cultural 
relativism.  Firstly, because it is derived from the culture of science and not ethno-
culturally vested, it disarms any criticisms prima facie.  Further, the on-going 
exploitation of discretions afforded under international law would be untenable if the 
Neo-Naturalist basis to human rights is accepted.  The transition to a human-centric 
paradigm would mitigate perceptions of hypocrisy as suggested by Feldman.   
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It should be noted that the basis of human rights vests in empirical research into an 
ontological aspect of nature and its substratum is epistemologically valid and hence, 
universally applicable.  Paradoxically, an acceptance of a Neo-Naturalist foundation 
to human rights precludes forcing such values on any individual or jurisdiction as 
freedom of thought and conscience are also human rights.  However, the increasing 
acceptance of human rights based on an ontological structure employing a defensible 
non ethno-cultural foundation will ensure that pressure grounded in rationality mounts 
on jurisdictions that reject human rights out of hand. 
 
It must be acknowledged that cultural relativity is an immutable aspect of the globe in 
which we live, and accordingly human rights doctrines must reflect this in their 
implementation.  Whilst, relativism does notionally fragment universal human rights, 
a solid empirical substratum promotes a strong position to advocate for a truly 
universal agreement on their fundamental value and content.  Different jurisdictions 
will still have to synthesise these human rights into culturally appropriate laws.  Thus, 
while the role of the nation-state shall remain a critical element in the enforcement of 
human rights in a human-centric paradigm, reformulating the quintessential notion of 
a nation-state is essential. 
 
It has been observed that an international norm of weak cultural relativism is rapidly 
establishing itself as the hegemonic reality, as demonstrated by the overlapping 
consensus in existing conventions (Donnelly, 2003).   One of the aspects of the Neo-
Naturalist basis to human rights proposed by Dhall (2009: in print) is that it resides in 
the ontological structure of nature, accordingly it is an intrinsic aspect of human life 
and thus transcends any given culture.x Further, holism as a basis to human rights is 
congruous with diverse cultural traditions.  Kausikan’s concern that human rights are 
irreconcilable with diverse cultures is allayed, because to varying degrees, a concept 
of holism derived from an epistemological process tending toward internalism 
underpins the cultural traditions in the belief systems he cites (Cranston, 1973; Khan, 
1990; Marcin, 2006; Zimmer, 1951).  These predominantly internally justified 
constructs of holism exist within ethno-cultural or religious traditions that are specific 
to the jurisdiction in question.   
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Neurological research articulates that the relationships between perception, cognition, 
social consensus and emotional value create the sense of Truth in an individual’s 
belief matrix (Newberg and Waldman, 2006).  This informs our understanding of 
ethno-cultural conflict by showing that human beings have a biological predisposition 
to reject beliefs perceived as different to their own, even if they are similar in 
substance but not form.  By increasingly understanding the relationship between 
individual and cultural value formation, a new platform is provided by Neo-
Naturalism upon which the perceived differences between cultures can be 
contextualised and rational processes embraced.  In a globalising and increasingly 
interconnected world this understanding can be employed to reduce conflict and 
articulate areas of commonality with deeper appreciation for the human condition that 
also takes into account the human neurological propensity to categorise, and hence 
arbitrarily fragment the world population.  
 
Kausikan also notes that diverse political systems may not be compatible with human 
rights.  Ghai’s (1994) perspective casts aspersions on the extent to which Kausikan’s 
arguments can be taken to reflect the full scope of the Asian perspective on human 
rights.  However, one critical methodological aspect that will need careful 
consideration is how the relatively abstract construct of holism is codified into a suite 
of human rights and how those rights will compare with the existing rights regimes.  
The methodology employed in this process must be non ethno-cultural specific yet 
methodologically sound in order to avoid charges of cultural imperialism.  That said, 
it is interesting to note that many of allegations of western cultural imperialism appear 
to overlook the history of the UDHR.   
 
In June 1947, in the lead up to the UDHR being drafted, numerous submissions were 
received by UNESCO sent by profound thinkers representing the varied cultural 
traditions that enrich the world.  The level of congruity between the principles 
espoused in the human rights doctrines and these diverse customs was shown to be 
significant as typified by such traditions as the Chinese position through the 
submission of Confucian philosopher Chung-Shu Lo and the Islamic world view 
through the Muslim poet Humayin Kabir.  It was noted at that time that there was 
vigorous debate around the ideologies of various participants in the drafting process, 
however, there was a fundamental agreement over the list of fundamental rights 
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(Glendon, 2001).  In addition, the members of the committee charged with the 
drafting the UDHR were drawn from different cultural backgrounds, including 
Lebanese philosopher Charles Malik, French philosopher Rene Cassin and P.C. 
Chang from China (Malik, 2000).  The significant level of global input into the 
articles that constitute the existing human rights doctrines should not be overlooked 
when considering allegations that human rights are a manifestation of western cultural 
imperialism.  Efforts to secularise human right doctrines in the future will only be 
enhanced with the ontological structure espoused by modern theories of holism. 
 
One element of Kausikan’s view is that differing levels of development characterise 
the mosaic of nation-states in the modern world.  This observation offers a valuable 
insight to human rights dialogue as it highlights that the cost of providing human 
rights to people in a poor country may exceed the resources of the government in 
question.  This issue was one of the driving forces behind the Declaration on the 
Right to Develop 1986.xi  The proposed basis to human rights extends the obligation 
to provide human rights beyond the state-citizen relationship, by virtue of seeking to 
justify a human-centric paradigm. The cost of providing human rights to the people of 
poor nations (e.g. civil infrastructure, schools, food and health and medical supplies) 
would have to be partially offset by first world countries.  However, this issue is one 
example that illustrates the complex environment in which human rights operate.  It 
creates a new legal problem from conflicting claims within the law itself, as the 
substantial redistribution of wealth is contrary to legal property rights, as currently 
constructed.  
 
Balancing the existing legal status quo, economic rationalism, prudent economic 
management and policy with universal and inalienable rights will require further 
attention. Whilst it is clear that a human rights framework derived from scientific 
research extends a deontological obligation toward the intelligentsia and powerful 
nations to work toward an appropriate modification of institutional systems, the 
proposed basis to human rights needs to integrate with the functional reality of the 
environment in which they operate.  This illustrates one of many issues that will 
require consideration, as a Neo-Naturalist basis to human rights will challenge the 
standards by which we judge the success or failure of all social institutions. 
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III. Reflections on Neo-Naturalism as a Fresh Paradigm 
in International Law 
 
Chief Justice Spigelman in his keynote address to the Ninth International Criminal 
Law Congress held in Canberra in 2004 noted that the tension between the positivist 
and Naturalist concept of human rights is problematic and requires resolution 
(Spigelman, 2004).  The Neo-Naturalist foundation of human rights proposed in 
Dhall (2009: in print) can resolve some of the existing dilemmas.  However, several 
issues require further analysis. 
 
The first question is whether the Neo-Naturalist basis for human rights posited in 
Dhall (2009: in print) would materially alter the substance or classification of existing 
rights.  Prima facie, it is logical that a degree of change may be required.  The current 
consensual basis to human rights tacitly accepts equality, inalienability and 
universality.  A degree of ‘tweaking’, if not wholesale reform would most likely be 
required in our institutions and procedures if a precise formulation of these concepts 
were taken to be the central elements of human rights.  Therefore, a definitive answer 
to the question posed above can only be ascertained after a deeper study of both the 
constituent elements of Neo-Naturalism and the existing human rights content and 
infrastructure.  A deconstruction of the methodology originally employed to codify 
the ethos of human rights into the particular articles drafted also needs to be 
undertaken.  Such thorough exploration will ensure that the methodology employed 
when codifying the principles of Neo-Naturalism will be sound and not ethno-
culturally specific. 
 
Whilst this paper has sought only to integrate a Neo-Naturalist legal basis to human 
rights, several socio-political aspects that will require further diligent analysis were 
exposed.  Developing nations may lack the physical infrastructure to develop and 
implement a universal human rights culture.  In such situations, the provision of 
infrastructure would beggar first-world nations and would not necessarily provide the 
aspired level of protection.  Protection is provided by the proper operation rather than 
mere existence of human rights infrastructure.  Lawyers are aware of this bifurcation, 
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as this notion is demonstrated in the gulf between formal and substantive justice.  
Thus, the integration of Neo-Naturalism would require that social, economic, cultural 
and ecological considerations be taken into account.  It may be argued that retains 
status-quo as it would prima facie identical to the current policy.  However, one may 
retort that the imperative for assisting the development of universal human rights is 
enhanced if holism is accepted as an ontological aspect of nature.  This contrasts with 
the existing, dominant paradigm, which specifically asserts that Cartesian duality 
characterises human existence. 
 
If the Neo-Naturalist basis to human rights is accepted then for the implementation of 
such a rights régime a second question will also require resolution.  How would this 
basis necessitate modifications to the institutions and mechanisms of both human 
rights and international law?  It was demonstrated that one such change is the 
transition from a state-centric to human-centric paradigm in international law.  The 
substantive content of a human-centric paradigm will need express deliberation for a 
resolution of complex issues.  A human-centric paradigm mandates greater 
congruency between ratified treaties and domestic legislation.  This would affirm 
Rule of Law and is essential to ensure effective concept transfer.  Clearly, moving 
from theory to practice will be complex.  Legitimate cultural relativism needs to be 
nurtured, whilst totalitarianism must be eschewed.  Such concerns are not limited to 
developing nations; the detention of Dr. Mohammad Haneef provides a recent 
Australian example in a first world nation.  It is a central precept of the Australian 
legal system that an accused person is innocent until proven guilty.  The deprivation 
of human rights when subjected to arbitrary detention treats the accused as though 
they are both guilty and ‘no longer human enough’ to warrant the protection of 
human rights (Amnesty International, 2007).  The laws that allowed this to occur are 
justified in the ‘national interest’.  Such practices are incongruous with the Rule of 
Law.  However, at the same time the protection of the Australian public needs to be 
assured as far as possible.  How the human-centric paradigm can resolve such 
tensions will require more in-depth research of the specific areas of law.  The central 
issue of this problem is to clarify the relationship of human rights to the democratic 
process; and to resolve whether they should remain subordinate, or whether as 
proposed in this paper, systemic reform should be implemented to elevate human 
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rights concerns to a level at which they may override other aspects of the process of 
governance.   
 
Kirby (2009) observed that an imperfection in democratic systems of government is 
the presumption that the people have the power to change laws once enacted.  The 
functional reality of democracy is different: not all parts of that process are open to 
the direct influence of the public.  In the Australian democratic model the 
composition of the Executive limb of government is drawn from the Legislature.  
Furthermore the functional head of the Executive limb of government, the Crown 
representative (Governor-General), is nominated by the Prime Minister.  The effect of 
these conventions is to undermine the Tripartite Separation of Powers doctrine.  This 
doctrine was explored in 1748 by French philosopher Charles Montesquieu in his 
magnum opus, L’esprit de Lois, and was central in the formation of the Australian 
Rule of Law.  Whilst the adopted conventions do function, there is a need for 
systemic reform to ensure that the Australian public have their civil liberties 
enshrined and protected. 
 
The third question is to determine to what extent the notion of ‘Western Imperialism’ 
would need to be swept aside in many Eastern countries.  It has been suggested that in 
open societies in which a conflict of ideals exists, people should be simply given a 
choice.  Thus, families are able to choose whether to live by traditional values or in 
compliance with human rights ideals.  It is suggested that this would be the 
appropriate manner to resolve that tension and that such a choice reflects the global 
trend toward the hegemonic norm of weak cultural relativism (Donnelly, 2003).  
However, a difference of opinion may arise within family units.  This is problematic, 
as inter-familial disputes are particularly sensitive issues in many Eastern countries.  
This shows that even the proposed solution is not a holistic answer.  The solutions to 
issues requiring resolution prior to the implementation of a universal human rights 
framework are not easily come by, notwithstanding an acceptance of the phenomena 
of quantum holism and the subsequent evolution of an ontologically derived human 
rights regime. 
 
Clearly further research is required to understand, integrate and implement current 
scientific advances into our intellectual conception of human beings and then into the 
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existing legal, political, social and economic structures.  Firstly the question is how 
these revelations should shape the law in general and human rights in particular.  
Modern politics is organised around the existence of the nation-state, and an 
emerging global reality is one in which the constituent population of any and every 
nation-state is becoming increasingly disparate. For example, the 2006 Australian 
census endorses this notion in finding that 64.1% of the Australian population come 
from a ‘non Australian’ background (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2006). This has 
resulted in a trend away from identifying countries along geo-political, ethnic or 
cultural lines.  The identity of the nation-state is evolving toward juridical entities that 
consist of ethnically diverse populations who share a common political life, 
predicated on Rule of Law.   Donnelly (2003) notes : 
 
Impartial public law, rather than charisma, divine donation, custom, inheritance, 
power, virtue or even the will of the people is increasingly seen as the source of 
legitimate authority…The transition from nationalist to territorial and juridical 
conceptions of political community has been closely associated with an ideology 
of human rights.  One’s rights depend not on who one is but simply on the fact 
one is a human being…this has taken the form of an emphasis on equal rights 
for all citizens.  
 
The ultimate legitimacy of nation-states depends on an increasing reliance on Rule of 
Law.  A stable Rule of Law is predicated upon impartiality and legal certainty, which 
in turn mandates an equal treatment of all citizens.  This is doubly poignant in the 
modern age, as if one is deemed persona non grata, justifiably or otherwise, 
developments in technology render the likelihood of apprehension far greater than in 
by-gone ages.  It becomes increasingly essential that an individual possesses 
fundamental, inalienable rights that ensure justice, as evidenced by the treatment of 
prisoners such as David Hicks and Mamdouh Habib (Lasery, 2007; Southwood, 
2005).  Indeed, the changing face of modern society mandates a degree of flexibility 
in order for our legal institutions to retain relevance.  A high-level UN panel noted 
(United Nations, 2004): 
 
technological revolution… has radically changed the worlds of communication, 
information processing, health and transportation has eroded borders, [and] 
altered migration.  
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The above extract, reiterates the observations that we live in a world in which our 
knowledge base is rapidly expanding and that any and every society contains a 
multiplicity of conventions and institutions.  These conventions and institutions are 
grounded in humanity’s penchant for iterative development that rely upon the 
construction of inherently abstract memes.  These memes affect our social interactions 
and institutions, such as the Rule of law, economics and systems of governance.  As a 
result, the diligent enquirer is led to a profound observation.  There is a strong 
emergent need to adapt, evolve and adjust ourselves to new knowledge if we are to 
retain intellectual and moral integrity.  This in turn creates a deontological obligation 
that falls foursquare upon the shoulders of the intelligentsia, to disseminate viable 
models that are better suited to the current information age.  Manifestations of such 
change abound, one such example is A.P Shah’s judgement in the Delhi High Court 
of July 2009 that decriminalised homosexuality.  It drew from a multiplicity of 
sources, both domestic and international to articulate jurisprudential reason.  Whilst 
critics of such jurisprudential reasoning assert that the approach is akin to ‘looking for 
friends across a room full of people’, such a process allows the judiciary to deal with 
issues avoided by law makers (Kirby, 2009).  It should not be overlooked that a 
tension exists between the long-term goals of peace, order and good government and 
the often short-term focus of elected officials, as policy positions are usually subject 
to the need to be re-elected. 
 
A further advantage of drawing from diverse sources of epistemologically valid data 
is that it avoids the ethno-cultural subjugation of a populace and fosters an 
environment in which the normative manifestation of the human rights culture is a 
‘hybridised vernacular’ of global public reason (Ivison, 2009).  This hybridised 
vernacular is the voice of moral human agency as human rights are already employed 
as the standard by which systems of government are judged by other nation-states 
(Sellars, 2002).  Recent commentaries on presidential elections held in Iran illustrate 
this (Nebehay, 2009; Human Rights Watch, 2009). 
 
This paper has sought to discuss the integration of a Neo-Naturalist paradigm into 
both international and human rights law.  Neo-Naturalism draws upon an 
epistemology more in step with a rapidly secularising and increasingly interconnected 
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world, yet retains a meaningful and material congruity with the various wisdom 
traditions woven into the tapestry of human society.  The congruence of Neo-
Naturalism with many of the various world’s wisdom traditions is attributable to the 
shared notion of ontological holism.  Many traditional value systems espouse some 
form of holism (Dhall, 2009 in print).  As we march toward the future, it is logical 
that the form our societies take is one that moves toward a greater access to justice for 
all.  Indeed, such reform is systemically desirable as it affirms Rule of law through 
greater legal certainty.  However, while the practical environment in which human 
rights operate is complex and subject to an assortment of additional influences, the 
need for reform of human rights in an age of cultural diversity and confrontation 
remains paramount.  This keeps us in step with the progress in the understanding of 
the human condition in an emerging global community. 
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